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IN THE
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OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Case Number : 45697
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vs.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERROR IN APPLYING A REASONABLE

PERSON STANDARD TO A MOTION TO SET ASIDE A VAP UNDER I.C.§7-1106(2)?
Shad argues that the plain language of Idaho Code §7-1106(2) requires this Court to enter
into a statutory interpretation. This is completely incorrect.
“The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.” State v.
Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). “Because ‘the best guide to
legislative intent is the words of the statute itself,’ the interpretation of a statute must begin with
the literal words of the statute.” Id. (quoting In re Permit No. 36–7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828
P.2d 848, 853 (1992)). When language is unambiguous, there is no reason for a court to consider
rules of statutory construction. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157
Idaho 180, 184–85, 335 P.3d 25, 29–30 (2014). A statute is ambiguous when:
[T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds
might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. However,
ambiguity is not established merely because different possible
interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then
all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered
ambiguous.... [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because an
astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it.
Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853,
856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014) (alterations in original) (quoting
BHA Invs., Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 358, 63 P.3d 482,
484 (2003)).
In this matter, the interpretative question of the statute is if the legislative intent was to
require the application of a reasonable person standard to the recession of the VAP.
The actual words of the statute at issue are. “(2) After the period for rescission, an
executed acknowledgment of paternity may be challenged only in court on the basis of fraud,

4

duress, or material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof upon the party challenging the
acknowledgment.” I.C. § 7-1106(2).
It is immediately clear that a reasonable person standard is not articulated in the actual,
clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Shad argues that a reasonable person standard
must be the legislative intent, as at the time of the 1996 amendment, “Idaho jurisprudence was
replete with interpretation of the analogous provision allowing judgments to be set aside on the
grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b)(1).” Respondent’s Brief p. 10. While it is true that at the time of amendment, IRCP
60(b)(1) was in place and there had been many cases examining the findings for “mistake,” it
must also be noted and examined that despite this replete jurisprudence, the legislature did not
include a reasonable person standard in the statute, nor did the legislature simply require a
“mistake” as contained in Rule 60(b)(1). The legislature set the requirement as a “fraud, duress,
or material mistake of fact.” The legislature did not include -any of the language from IRCP
60(b)(1), rather the legislature used language related to contracts and the standards for relieving a
party from a contract.
A material mistake of fact is contract evaluation tool used to relieve a party from
performance of a contract. This term comes with its own Idaho jurisprudence setting forth the
requirements for utilization. “[A] mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from
ignorance, surprise, or misplaced confidence. The mistake must be material, that is, so
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.” Leydet v. City of Mountain
Home, 119 Idaho 1041, 1044, 812 P.2d 755, 758 (Ct.App.1991) (citations omitted).
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It is this language and jurisprudence the legislature utilized in its decision to not use the
word “mistake” but to utilize the term “material mistake of fact” in the language of I.C.§71106(2).
Shad’s assertion that utilizing the language of the statue would result in an absurd
application is grossly self-serving and unsupported. The jurisprudence of a material mistake of
fact in contract law extends back before Idaho was a state. In Alan v. Hammond, 36 U.S.63
(1837) the United States Supreme Court indicated that a contract entered into by mistake fails as
there is no assent to the contract. Later, in 1876 the United States Supreme Court in Utley v.
Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29 stated, “Where there is a misunderstanding as to any thing material, the
requisite mutuality of assent as to such thing is wanting; consequently the supposed contract does
not exist, and neither party is bound.” Here the material mistake insulates itself into American
jurisprudence. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated, “A mistake may justify grounds for relief if
it si so substantial and fundamental that it defeats the object of the parties.” Maroun v. Wyreless
Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 611, 114 P.3d 974, 981 (2005), abrogated on other issues by
Wandering Trails, LLC v. Big Bite Excavation, Inc., 156 Idaho 586, 329 P.3d 368 (2014).
The existence of a legal principle for 181 years seems to indicate that its use does not
result in an absurd application.
The final argument by Shad states that a public policy should exist to preclude the
implementation of the “material mistake of fact” standard for a rescission of a VAP. The public
policy as to the rescission of a VAP should be to allow for the identification and legal acceptance
of a biological parent and not the furtherance of a fiction based on a material mistake.
As the plain language of I.C. §7-1106 does not include the requirement of a reasonable
person analysis either in the statute or the interpretation of the “material mistake of fact”
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provision. The District Court erred in applying this standard for the review of the Jordain’s
Motion to Rescind the VAP. Any analysis of the “material mistake of fact” provision should be
pursuant to the contract jurisprudence that mirrors the language used by the legislature. This
analysis should require an evaluation if the mistake was an unintentional act or omission arising
from ignorance, surprise, or misplaced confidence and that the mistake be material, that is, so
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.
In this matter, the mistake by Jordain was the unintentional act of identifying Shad as the
father of her child based on her ignorance in remembering the physical encounters with
Matthew. This mistake is absolutely material as it defeats the intention of Jordain to correctly
identify the father of T.J.H.
The determination of the District Court should be reversed and the VAP in this matter
rescinded.
II.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERROR IN DETERMINING THAT JORDAIN DID
NOT ACT AS A REASONABLE PERSON?
As noted above, the reasonable and prudent person standard does not apply to a

rescission of a VAP. Therefore any findings of the District Court by the District Court on this
matter are irrelevant and an abuse of discretion.
Should any analysis of a reasonable person be reviewed, the District Court erred in its
analysis as the actions of Jordain as set forth in her pleadings satisfy the requirement.
Additionally, the absence of any other facts to counter those set forth by Jordain show an abuse
of discretion and there is no contrary evidence to weigh.
The determination by the District Court as to any reasonable person analysis should be
reversed.
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CONCLUSION
In this matter, the District Court erred in imposing a reasonable person requirement into
the statute where none existed and then in not finding Jordain acted as a reasonable person.
Jordain presented, by clear and convincing evidence that she acted under a material mistake of
fact when she signed the VAP in July, 2014. This mistake resulted in her stating that Shad was
the father of T.J.H. when he was not. This Court should vacate the Order of the Magistrate Court
and District Court denying the rescission of the VAP and rescind the VAP based on Jordain’s
uncontradicted material mistake of fact.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of August, 2018.

_____________________________________
Larren K. Covert, Esq.
Of Swafford Law, PC
Attorney for Jordain Bradford
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